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Abstract
This article identiﬁes two countervailing sets of norms–one promoting humanitarian
engagement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conﬂict in order to
protect populations in need, and the other prohibiting such engagement with listed
‘terrorist’ groups in order to protect security–and discusses how this conﬂict of norms
might affect the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving
assistance in areas under the control of one of these groups. Rooted in international
humanitarian law (IHL), the ﬁrst set of norms provides a basis for humanitarian
* The authors wish to thank Elizabeth Holland and Brian Itami. This paper is based on an HPCR Working
Paper, available at: http://www.hpcrresearch.org/research/criminalizing-humanitarian-engagement (last
visited 04 December 2011). Since July 2010, HPCR has led a research and policy project on the impact of
counter-terrorism laws and policies on humanitarian action. This project, ‘Humanitarian Action Under
Scrutiny: Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement’, has beneﬁted from the thoughtful reﬂections of the
Working Group on Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement. Any errors are those of the authors.
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assisting populations under their control and promoting compliance with the rules of
IHL. The second set of rules attempts to curtail ﬁnancial and other forms of material
support, including technical training and co-ordination, to listed ‘terrorist’
organizations, some of which may qualify as NSAGs under IHL. The article
highlights counter-terrorism regulations developed by the United States and the
United Nations Security Council, though other states and multilateral bodies have
similar regulations. The article concludes by sketching ways in which humanitarian
organizations might respond to the identiﬁed tensions.
‘Material support’ is a valuable resource by deﬁnition. Such support frees up other
resources within the [terrorist] organization that may be put to violent ends. It
also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups–legitimacy that
makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise
funds–all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.1 (Chief Justice Roberts)
In recent months, many working in the humanitarian profession have contem-
plated the image of an aid worker standing before a criminal court, accused of
providing support for terrorism while conducting legitimate humanitarian activities.
This article explores how that image came about, and how life-saving and impartial
humanitarian assistance may be legally construed as providing unlawful beneﬁts to
non-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 listed as ‘terrorist’ organizations.
Humanitarian assistance delivered in times of armed conﬂict and its
corollary–the autonomous negotiation between independent humanitarian organ-
izations and all parties to conﬂict–have often come under pressure from security
and political demands. International humanitarian law (IHL) has sought to balance
the security interests of the parties to an armed conﬂict with the humanitarian
interest of ensuring that life-saving goods and services reach civilians and others
hors de combat even in the midst of ﬁghting.3
For the past decade, a quiet development has altered this balance. The
promulgation by states of domestic criminal laws prohibiting material support to
listed terrorist entities, and multilateral laws and policies creating a corresponding
global counter-terrorism regime, present serious but little-discussed concerns for
those engaged in the provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance in armed
1 Chief Justice Roberts, United States Supreme Court, writing on behalf of the majority, US Supreme Court,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
2 This article uses the term ‘non-state armed groups’ as a general reference for non-state entities that engage
in hostilities or that perpetrate acts of terrorism (or both). The use of this term is not meant to qualify the
legal status of any of the non-state entities identiﬁed in this article. Acts of terrorism can be perpetrated
during an armed conﬂict or outside of an armed conﬂict. This article does not take a position on whether
any speciﬁc ‘terrorist’ group (as designated by states or multilateral bodies in their counter-terrorism
regulations) constitutes an organized armed group for purposes of IHL.
3 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III (GC III), Art. 9; Geneva Convention IV (GC IV), Arts. 10 and 23;
Additional Protocol I (AP I), Art. 70; Additional Protocol II (AP II), Art. 18.
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624conﬂicts involving certain NSAGs. The interaction between long-standing norms of
IHL providing modest but clear protection for the work of impartial, independent
humanitarian organizations and these domestic laws, donor policies, and multi-
lateral norms is yet to be fully understood. This article seeks to explore
contradictions between various state commitments, and to reﬂect brieﬂy on the
potential responses of the humanitarian community to the dilemmas posed by the
counter-terrorism framework.
This article proceeds in three sections. The ﬁrst section provides an
overview of IHL provisions pertaining to humanitarian engagement in situations of
non-international armed conﬂict (NIAC). In addition to laying out the IHL
terrain regulating humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, this section outlines
relevant developments in international law and multilateral policy building
upon IHL and strengthening humanitarian claims for access and autonomous
negotiation with NSAGs for the purpose of assisting and protecting vulnerable
populations. The second section discusses recent developments concerning
material-support-of-terrorism laws in the United States, particularly the recent
case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (Holder v. HLP).4 In addition,
this section explores US administrative laws and donor policies imposing counter-
terrorism-based restrictions on various forms of support to listed terrorist groups or
individuals. It draws connections between US material-support laws and several
key UN Security Council resolutions on global counter-terrorism. The ﬁnal main
section provides an explanatory framework for understanding what might motivate
governments to take contradictory approaches to humanitarian engagement
with NSAGs, and then sketches a number of possible ways in which the
humanitarian community might respond to the legal and policy tensions discussed
in the article. The conclusion highlights the fact that, despite this tension, neither
the humanitarian imperative of assisting populations in need of life-saving relief
nor the security imperative of preventing resources to be unduly transferred to
listed ‘terrorist’ organizations will be going away any time soon. Beyond the
conceptual nature of this tension, states in a dialogue with humanitarian
organizations might attempt to establish procedures, principles, and practices that
would facilitate co-ordinated planning and execution of humanitarian operations in
these situations.
International humanitarian law bases for humanitarian
engagement with non-state armed groups
This section sketches the mission of humanitarian organizations and how
IHL provides clear, although limited, bases for such organizations to engage
with NSAGs in NIAC. It aims to outline the set of norms underlying
humanitarian engagement with NSAGs so that those norms may be juxtaposed
4 US Supreme Court, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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section. In outlining the bases for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs under
broadly accepted interpretations of IHL, this section does not enter into the
discussion on the status and content of a ‘right’ (if any) to provide or receive
humanitarian assistance in armed conﬂict.5
The mission of humanitarian organizations
The core and distinctive mission of humanitarian organizations is to provide life-
saving assistance to populations in need in times of armed conﬂict. To deliver this
assistance, humanitarian organizations must, operationally and under law, seek the
consent of the relevant party or parties.6 Practically speaking, in a NIAC where a
population is under the control of an NSAG, humanitarian organizations must
negotiate their access with the NSAG and, in most cases, seek the NSAG’s co-
operation in order to ensure the safety and integrity of an organization’s operations.
While by deﬁnition the purpose of humanitarian assistance is limited to provide
life-saving relief for the population, NSAGs may derive direct or indirect beneﬁts
from this interaction.
5 See, e.g., Heike Speiker, ‘The right to give and receive humanitarian assistance’, in Hans-Joachim Heintze
and Andrej Zwitter (eds), International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut Through Legal
Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2011, pp. 7–18; Yoram Dinstein, ‘The
right to humanitarian assistance’,i nNaval War College Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2000, pp. 77–92; Ruth Abril
Stoffels, ‘Legal regulation of humanitarian assistance in armed conﬂict: achievements and gaps’,i n
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004, pp. 515–546; Rebecca Barber, ‘Facilitating
humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights law’,i nInternational Review of
the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, 2009, pp. 383–391.
6 The content and extent of the obligation to seek the consent of the relevant party or parties may be
discerned by reference to the treaty provisions and customary law standards applicable to a speciﬁc
situation. IHL treaty provisions pertaining to humanitarian access in international armed conﬂicts
(including situations of occupation) include, among others, GC IV, Arts. 10, 11, 23, 30, 59, and 63; AP I,
Art. 70(1). Such provisions in NIACs include Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions (‘An
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services
to the Parties to the conﬂict’); AP II, Art. 18. See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck,
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC and Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2005, ‘Rule 55’, pp. 196–197 (ﬁnding a rule of customary international law such that: ‘[t]he
parties to the conﬂict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for
civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to
their right of control’). Regarding NIACs, AP II has a higher threshold of application than Common
Article 3: AP II, Art. 1(1). AP II states that humanitarian organizations must obtain the consent of the
High Contracting Party concerned: AP II, Art. 18(2). The ICRC’s Commentary on the provision states
that, ‘In principle the “High Contracting Party concerned” means the government in power. In
exceptional cases when it is not possible to determinewhich are the authorities concerned, consent is to be
presumed in view of the fact that assistance for the victims is of paramount importance and should not
suffer any delay’. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987,
para. 4884. The Commentary further states that the state-consent requirement in Article 18(2) of AP II
‘does not in any way reduce the ICRC’s right of initiative’ laid down in Common Article 3; as a result, ‘the
ICRC continues to be entitled to offer its services to each party’. Ibid., paras. 4891–4892.
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IHL provides solid bases for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in NIACs.7 It
does so, for example, in terms of offering humanitarian services (and by implication
co-ordinating and delivering such services),8 as well as caring for the wounded and
sick.9 The UN Security Council has reafﬁrmed these bases in at least two ways. First,
the Council has increasingly called attention to the importance of ‘all parties’ to
conﬂict in agreeing to and facilitating humanitarian relief operations, implying that
NSAGs should co-operate with humanitarian organizations in the delivery of
assistance.10 Second, the Council has requested humanitarian organizations’
7 Because NSAGs fulﬁlling certain criteria may be parties to NIACs only, this article focuses on IHL
provisions applicable to that type of conﬂict. For an overview of IHL pertaining to humanitarian access in
both international armed conﬂicts (including situations of occupation) and non-international armed
conﬂicts, see, e.g., H. Speiker, above note 5, pp. 7–18.
8 Common Article 3; AP II, Art. 18. According to the ICRC, states may not regard an offer of humanitarian
relief during an NIAC as an unfriendly act. Sandoz et al., above note 6, p. 41; see also International Court
of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 242, stating generally that: ‘There can be no doubt that the
provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political
afﬁliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to
international law’.
While parties may impose certain conditions on relief actions, these conditions cannot intentionally
inhibit the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population, even behind enemy lines. See Sandoz
et al., above note 6, paras. 4887 and 4888, stating that: ‘The [relief] actions would have to strictly comply
with any conditions that might be imposed (examples: arrangement of transits in accordance with a
precise timetable and itinerary, checking on convoys)’, but emphasizing that: ‘Once relief actions are
accepted in principle, the authorities are under an obligation to co-operate, in particular by facilitating the
rapid transit of relief consignments and by ensuring the safety of convoys’.
9 See, e.g., Common Article 3(2): ‘The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for’; AP II, Arts. 7, 8,
9(1): ‘Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all available
help for the performance of their duties. They shall not be compelled to carry out tasks which are not
compatible with their humanitarian mission’; 10(1): ‘Under no circumstances shall any person be
punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person
beneﬁting therefrom’; and 18(1): ‘Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party,
such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the
performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conﬂict. The civilian
population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked’.
10 See, e.g., UN Security Council Res. 1964, 22 December 2010, concerning the situation in Somalia (the
Council ‘Calls on all parties and armed groups to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of
humanitarian personnel and supplies, and demands that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered access
for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance across the country’); UNSC
Res. 1923, 25 May 2010, para. 22, concerning the situation in Chad, the Central African Republic, and
Sudan (the Council ‘Reafﬁrms the obligation of all parties to implement fully the rules and principles of
international humanitarian law, particularly those regarding the protection of humanitarian personnel,
and furthermore requests all the parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with immediate, free
and unimpeded access to all persons in need of assistance, in accordance with applicable international
law’); UNSC Res. 1894, 11 November 2009, para. 14 (concerning its thematic area of ‘Protection of
civilians’, the Council ‘Stresses the importance for all parties to armed conﬂict to cooperate with
humanitarian personnel in order to allow and facilitate access to civilian populations affected by armed
conﬂict’). In addition to demanding that all parties to armed conﬂict adhere to their obligations under
IHL, the Security Council has also demonstrated a tendency to urge all parties, including NSAGs, to
ensure that the civilian population is protected and that the population’s needs are met. See, e.g., UNSC
Res. 1894, 11 November 2009, para. 1 (the Council ‘Demands that parties to armed conﬂict complystrictly
with the obligations applicable to them under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law,
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states’ armed forces listed by the Secretary-General.11 In other words, the Council
has stated not only that NSAGs should engage with humanitarian organizations in
order to ensure the provision of life-saving assistance but also that humanitarian
organizations should engage with NSAGs as a means to prevent speciﬁc violations
of IHL, particularly those against women and children. A conﬂict of norms arises
between these provisions of IHL and UN Security Council decisions underlying
humanitarian assistance, on the one hand, and criminal laws prohibiting
the provision of material support or resources to listed ‘terrorist’ groups, on the
other.
Counter-terrorism laws and policies limiting engagement with
certain armed groups
While a range of states have enacted domestic laws and instituted policies similar to
those developed by the United States, this article focuses on US criminal law and
administrative counter-terrorism regulations, as well as related UN Security Council
resolutions, for three reasons. First, since the Holder v. HLP Supreme Court
decision, the US has the most well-articulated material-support jurisprudence,
which may provide guidance on the calculus used by many states to limit or
criminalize support to listed terrorist entities (including in, but certainly not limited
to, situations of armed conﬂict). Second, since the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States, the US has widely been seen as providing global
leadership and intellectual innovation in the development and enforcement of
domestic and international counter-terror regimes, often in the face of strident
criticism. Third, while the UN Security Council resolutions discussed in this article
are the result of multilateral negotiation and consensus, it is broadly recognized that
the powerful and far-reaching resolutions on counter-terrorism were and continue
to be deeply inﬂuenced by US approaches.12 As such, current and future
as well as to implement all relevant decisions of the Security Council and in this regard, urges them to take
all required measures to respect and protect the civilian population and meet its basic needs’); UNSC Res.
1417, 14 June 2002, para. 5 (concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the Council ‘calls on the de facto authorities in regions affected to ensure the protection of civilians and
the rule of law’); UNSC Res. 1564, 18 September 2004, preamble (concerning the situation in Sudan, the
Council stressed that ‘the Sudanese rebel groups, particularly the Justice and Equality Movement and the
Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement, must also take all necessary steps to respect international
humanitarian law and human rights law’). See generally Aristotle Constantinides, ‘Human rights
obligations and accountability of armed opposition groups: the practice of the UN Security Council’,i n
Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010, pp. 89–110.
11 UNSC Res. 1612, 26 July 2005; UNSC Res. 1882, 4 August 2009; UNSC Res. 1960, 16 December 2010.
12 The role of the UN Security Council in formulating multilateral counter-terrorism policy should not be
underestimated. In discussing why so many countries adopted similar counter-terrorism laws after 9/11,
Kim Lane Scheppele has identiﬁed the change as ‘radiat[ing] out from the U.N. Security Council’. Kim
Lane Scheppele, ‘The international standardization of national security law’,i nJournal of National
Security Law and Policy, Vol. 4, 2010, p. 439.
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merit close attention, not only in their broad extra-territorial reach but also
insofar as they may inﬂuence multilateral frameworks and other domestic
jurisdictions.13
United States counter-terrorism regime
The US counter-terrorism legal and policy regime, at least to the extent that it may
affect humanitarianism, is comprised of statutes, executive orders, immigration and
removal provisions, and administrative regulations, each of which is brieﬂy outlined
below.
Prohibitions on providing material support or resources
US federal law prohibits knowingly providing ‘material support or resources’ to
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).14 For purposes of the statute, ‘material
support or resources’ includes any property (tangible or intangible) or service
(including lodging, training,15 expert advance or assistance,16 communications
equipment, facilities, personnel,17 or transportation).
The only explicit exceptions to the prohibition under the federal statute
pertain to the provision of medicine and religious materials. This provision is
narrower than the exemption in an earlier version of a similar statute, which at the
time exempted ‘humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such
13 The domestic law in other states, such as Australia, also has the capacity to affect humanitarian
engagement with NSAGs. See, e.g., Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995, as amended, c. 102.1–102.8 (Australia).
See generally Sara Pantuliano, Kate Mackintosh, and Samir Elhawary, with Vicki Metcalfe, ‘Counter-
terrorism and humanitarian action: tensions, impact and ways forward’,i nHPG Policy Brief 43, October
2011, pp. 2–5, available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7347.pdf (last visited 4 December 2011);
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict Research, ‘Humanitarian action under scrutiny:
criminalizing humanitarian engagement’, HPCR Working Paper, February 2011, pp. 23–25, available at:
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/research/criminalizing-humanitarian-engagement (last visited 4 December
2011); Kristina Thorne, ‘Terror lists and humanitarian assistance’,i nHumanitarian Exchange Magazine,
Issue 37, March 2007, available at: http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2874 (last visited 24 January
2012).
14 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(a)(1); para. 2339B(g)(4); see also 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A(b)(1). As of September
2011, the Secretary of State had designated forty-nine organizations as FTOs; the list is available at: http://
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited 4 December 2011). US federal law also prohibits
providing material support or resources to ‘terrorists’: 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A.
15 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A(b)(2), deﬁned as ‘instruction or teaching designed to impart a speciﬁc skill, as
opposed to general knowledge’.
16 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A(b)(3), deﬁned as ‘advice or assistance derived from scientiﬁc, technical, or other
specialized knowledge’.
17 According to the statute, ‘No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term
“personnel” unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a
foreign terrorist organization with one or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work
under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise
direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign
terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.’ 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(h).
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encompass anything other than medicine itself and therefore seems to exclude all
otheractivities (such as medical treatment or technical training) and resources (such
as medical supplies or equipment) associated with the provision of medical
assistance.19 While the statute provides a limited basis on which humanitarian
organizations may apply to the government to be exempted from prosecution, the
grounds for granting such an exemption are narrow.20
Criminal liability arises from both the objective element of the crime
(the so-called actus reus–that is, committing a prohibited, or omitting a required,
act) and the subjective element (the so-called mens rea–having a speciﬁed level of
knowledge or intent, or both, concerning the act). In terms of material support,
the offender need not have intended to further the terrorist aims of the group to
violate the statute. Rather, it is sufﬁcient under the statute that the person providing
material support has knowledge either that the organization is an FTO (that is,
the organization is designated as such by the Secretary of State in accordance with
US law) or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism or terrorist
activity.21 The statute prohibits providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to
provide material support or resources to such organizations. A violation of
the statute may entail a ﬁne or imprisonment of up to ﬁfteen years, or both. If
the death of any person results, the violator ‘may be imprisoned for any term
of years or for life’.22 The US may exercise jurisdiction over an individual, even if he
or she is not a US national, who violates (or aids, abets, or conspires with an
individual who violates) the statute and who is later ‘brought into or found in the
[US], even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside [the US]’.23 In
effect, this provision means that the personnel of an organization headquartered
outside the US and made up entirely of non-US staff, with operations completely
outside the US, could be subject to US criminal jurisdiction if they ﬁnd themselves
in the US.
18 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A (1994 edition); 110 Stat. 1214 title III, subtitle B sec. 323, 24 April 1996.
19 The House Conference Report accompanying the original legislation stated that medicine ‘should be
understood to be limited to the medicine itself, and does not include the vast array of medical supplies’.5
H.Rept. 104–383, section 103, 1995. See also Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Testimony at Oversight Hearing on
Amendments to the Material Support for Terrorism Laws: Section 805 of the USA PATRIOT Act and
Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Judiciary, 10 May 2005, arguing that: ‘[t]o prevent
outbreaks, humanitarian organizations must provide displaced people with water puriﬁcation systems,
toilets, tents, and other such goods which are not “medicine” but nonetheless serve an absolutely critical
medical function’.
20 ‘No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term “personnel”, “training”,
or “expert advice or assistance” if the provision of that material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization was approved by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Attorney
General’. 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(j). However, the statute provides that the ‘Secretary of State may not
approve the provision of any material support that may be used to carry out terrorist activity’. 18 U.S.C.
para. 2339B(j).
21 ‘Terrorism’ as deﬁned in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989, and ‘terrorist activity’ as deﬁned in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
22 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(a)(1).
23 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(d)(1)(C).
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constitutionality of the statute that prohibits knowingly providing ‘material support
or resources’ to designated FTOs. The case arose as a pre-enforcement challenge
brought by two organizations and six individuals seeking a ruling as to whether the
three activities that the plaintiffs wanted to engage in would violate the statute, and,
if so, whether the statute as applied to those proposed activities would contravene
the US Constitution. In short, the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) and others
wanted to engage in three proposed activities, but could not for fear of prosecution
under the statute. Those three activities were: training members of the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK) to use international law to resolve disputes; teaching PKK
members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations
for relief; and engaging in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds living in Turkey or
Tamils living in Sri Lanka. The HLP argued that certain constitutional protections–
including freedom of speech and association, and due process of law (which
prohibits overly vague criminal laws)–precluded the government from enforcing
the statute against the HLP’s proposed activities.24
The litigation leading to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Holder v. HLP
spent many years making its way through US courts.25 In 1994, Congress enacted
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, a section of which deﬁnes the
crime of providing material support or resources to terrorists.26 In 1996, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amended the
section prohibiting material support to terrorists and added a section prohibiting
the provision of material support or resources to FTOs.27 Combined, these federal
criminal statutes set out the crimes of providing ‘material support or resources’ to
terrorists and foreign terrorist groups, and enumerate the broad set of activities seen
as providing beneﬁt to these groups. Both sections were amended by the post-9/11
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (which increased the penalties for committing ‘material
support’ crimes and added ‘expert advice or assistance’ to the list of prohibited
forms of support), and by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) of 2004, which amended and clariﬁed deﬁnitions within the two sections.28
After a lower-court decision voided language in the statute for vagueness, the
government appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court accepted the case. In
24 Holder v. HLP, Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al., pp. 17–21.
25 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.Supp.2d 1176, C.D.Cal. (1998); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,
205 F.3d 1130, 9th Cir. (2000); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185, C.D.Cal.
(2004); Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice, 393 F.3d 902, 9th Cir. (2004);
Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, C.D.Cal. (2005); Humanitarian Law Project
v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 9th Cir. (2009); Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 48, (2009); US
Supreme Court, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
26 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A.
27 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B.
28 For an excellent summary of the statute and its legislative history, see Charles Doyle, Terrorist Material
Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, Congressional Research Service, 19 July 2010,
available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf (last visited 4 December 2011). The Center for
Constitutional Rights, which litigated the case, hosts a collection of pleadings and decisions pertaining to
the case, including all the case documents referenced in this section, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/
holder-v-humanitarian-law-project (last visited 4 December 2011).
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631short, the Court was asked to consider the claim that the statute was
unconstitutional because it was either too vague or too broad in relation to the
HLP’s proposed activities.
In its opening brief to the Supreme Court, the HLP argued that the First
Amendment to the US Constitution (which states that ‘Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech’) protected their intended activities, which they
characterized as pure political speech; that the material-support statute was unfairly
vague; that portions of the statute impermissibly criminalized pure speech and
discriminated on the basis of content; and that the statutory provisions at stake
violated the constitutionally enshrined freedom to associate.29 The HLP asserted
that the Court could avoid addressing constitutional questions by interpreting the
statute to require proof of intent to further an FTO’s unlawful ends.30
The government’s arguments relied largely on the speciﬁcity included in
the IRTPA, which amended the existing statute in regard to the terms ‘knowingly’,
‘service’, ‘training’, ‘expert advice or assistance’, and ‘personnel’. The government
argued that the statute is not void for vagueness just because the application of the
terms ‘training’, ‘expert advice or assistance’, ‘personnel’,o r‘service’ may be difﬁcult
to deﬁne in some circumstances. Rather, the government stated, ‘[v]agueness lies
not in occasional uncertainty about whether an incriminating fact has been proved,
but in fundamental indeterminacy about what that fact is’.31 The government
highlighted the difference between membership in a designated terrorist group or
independent promotion of the political goals of the group–which were not
prohibited by the statute–and the act of ‘giving material support to facilitate
terrorism’, for which there was no constitutionally protected right.32 The
government stated that the petitioners ‘may join the PKK and LTTE, gather with
those groups’ members, and discuss subjects of mutual interest’.33 According to the
government’s viewpoint, the material-support statute regulated activity when the
petitioner wanted to ‘do more than engage in discussion with terrorist groups’.34
Multiple organizations submitted amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) briefs
to the Supreme Court. One amicus brief brought by a collection of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) mentioned that the statute could deleteriously
affect the delivery of humanitarian aid. Foregrounding the discussion by declaring
that the ‘[p]rovision of humanitarian aid often requires working with and providing
29 Holder v. HLP, Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al., pp. 17–21.
30 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
31 Holder v. HLP, Brief for the Government (respondents), p. 14.
32 Holder v. HLP, Reply Brief for the Government (respondents), p. 38, citing Humanitarian Law Project
v. Reno, 205 F.3d, 1130, 1133, 9th Cir. (2000). In its Opening Brief, the Government–citing a Supreme
Court decision explaining that ‘peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime’–argued
that the material-support statute at issue ‘is fully consistent with this principle: it does not prevent
petitioners from peaceably assembling with members of the PKK and LTTE for lawful discussion. It
prevents the separate step of rendering material support, in the form of property or services, to these
groups based on their demonstrated willingness to commit acts of terror rather than on their political
views.’ Opening Brief for the Government (respondents), p. 61, citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 (1937).
33 Holder v. HLP, Reply Brief for the Government (respondents), p. 39.
34 Ibid.
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632expert advice and technical assistance to local actors’, the organizations stressed
that, when providing such aid, they ‘adhere strictly to certain universal principles of
humanitarian assistance. These principles require all providers of aid to draw sharp
lines between humanitarian activities, which they support, and military activities,
which they do not’.35 Nonetheless, the organizations noted, ‘in the context of war
zones, particularly in geographic areas controlled or dominated by designated
groups, some form of engagement with these groups, their members, or their
supporters is sometimes inevitable’.36 The organizations argued that, when
providing instructions or guidance to local groups to further humanitarian aid
operations, they were engaging in First Amendment-protected activity. At the same
time, the organizations observed that the material-support statute does ‘not clearly
delineate the space available for amici to conduct on-the-ground humanitarian aid
activities’, and gave examples pertaining to Sri Lanka.37
The US’s obligations under international law were not raised or addressed
by the plaintiffs, the government, or the Court.38 Potentially to the surprise of
individuals trained in legal systems in which international law is automatically
incorporated into domestic law or in which international law provides a stand-alone
basis for individuals to bring legal challenges against domestic laws, in the US
litigators rarely rely solely on international law to challenge federal statutes. Rather,
US lawyers frame their legal challenges in terms of constitutional rights.39 Partly as a
result, the Supreme Court does not assess the US’s compliance with its international
legal obligations with the frequency with which some other countries’ highest courts
assess their respective governments’ compliance with international law. It is not
clearat the time of writing howthe US government would view the material-support
statute in light of its IHL or international human rights law obligations.40
35 Holder v. HLP, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Carter Center, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Grassroots
International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, the Institute for Conﬂict Analysis and
Resolution at George Mason University, the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame
University, Operation USA, and Peace Appeal Foundation in Support of Humanitarian Law Project, et al.,
23 November 2009, pp. 25–26.
36 Ibid., p. 26.
37 Ibid., pp. 26–27.
38 The dissent referred to the Geneva Conventions in relation to what type of ‘relief’ was meant by the
plaintiffs’ proposal to ‘teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the
United Nations for relief’ (internal citations omitted; emphasis added in the dissent). US Supreme Court,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2739 (2010).
39 An overview, with an emphasis on criminal procedure, of how–and the extent to which–various systems
incorporate international legal norms into their domestic legal orders is available in Chrisje Brants and
Stijn Franken, ‘The protection of fundamental human rights in criminal process: general report’,i n
Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 5, October 2009, pp. 7, 14–16.
40 For discussions about the compatibility of the US’s IHL obligations with its domestic counter-terrorism
laws, see Justin A. Fraterman, ‘Criminalizing humanitarian relief: are US material support for terrorism
laws compatible with international humanitarian law?’, January 2011, available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1750963 (last visited 4 December 2011); Elizabeth Holland, ‘Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
and the potential to cripple humanitarian assistance in armed conﬂict’, June 2011, available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1939008 (last visited 4 December 2011); Jennifer R. White, ‘IEEPA’s override authority:
potential for a violation of the Geneva Conventions’ right to access for humanitarian organizations?’,i n
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 8, 2006, pp. 2019–2055.
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633In a 6–3 ruling, the majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute. The Court used a broad conception of fungibility
rooted in congressional ﬁndings–namely that, while some FTOs engage in political
and humanitarian activities, such organizations ‘are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct’.41
The Court noted that ‘Congress has avoided any restriction on independent
advocacy’, which would have been prohibited, ‘or indeed any activities not directed
to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups’.42 Three justices
dissented, stating that at a minimum the government should have to show that the
‘defendants provided support that they knew was signiﬁcantly likely to help the
organization pursue its unlawful terrorist aims’.43
Executive Order 13224
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (EO 13224) on 23
September 2001.44 The Department of the Treasury’sO f ﬁce of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) administers the Order, which allows government authorities to
designate and block (that is, freeze) the assets of individuals and entities that, among
other things, ‘assist in, sponsor, or provide ﬁnancial, material, or technological
support for ...or other services to or in support of’ certain acts of terrorism or
designated terrorists or terrorist groups, or that are ‘otherwise associated with’
designated terrorists or terrorist groups.45 OFAC places the designated person or
entity on its list of ‘Specially Designated Nationals’ (SDNs) and identiﬁes them as
‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’ (SDGT). With limited exceptions, all
property and interests in property of designated parties in the US are frozen, as are
transactions by US persons or within the US in such property or interests in
property, including making a contribution of services for the beneﬁt of designated
parties. EO 13224 prohibits donations by US persons to designated parties of articles
intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine.46 OFAC
may grant general or speciﬁc licenses to organizations to engage in certain forms of
activity otherwise prohibited under EO 13224, yet it is difﬁcult to discern from
publicly available information the extent to which humanitarian organizations have
successfully obtained such licenses.
Through an amendment in the USA PATRIOT Act, the government may
impose all the blocking effects of a designation–including freezing the party’s assets
and criminalizing its transactions–without actually designating the party as an
41 US Supreme Court, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710, 2724, 2729 (2010).
42 Ibid., at 2711.
43 Ibid., at 2740.
44 Pursuant to the authorities of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code.
45 EO 13224, sections 1(c)–(d).
46 EO 13224, section 4; see also 50 U.S.C. para. 1702(b)(2).
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634SDGT.47 To impose all the freezing effects, the government needs only to assert that
it has opened an investigation into designating the entity.
OFAC has listed several thousand organizations and numerous individuals,
most of whom are non-US parties, under EO 13224.48 US organizations subject to
EO 13224, which have a stronger constitutional basis to challenge the Order, have
brought legal actions against the imposition of sanctions without a warrant based on
probable cause and fair notice of the charges,49 as well as against the timing and
process of a designation.50 These challenges have not, thus far, made reference to the
provisions of IHL discussed in the previous section.
Immigration and removal provisions
In addition to being subject to criminal and civil proceedings, non-US individuals
who provide material support to certain NSAGs may be denied admission to, or
deported from, the US. In this way, counter-terrorism laws, in conjunction with
immigration and removal provisions, may affect humanitarian relief personnel
attempting to visit, reside in, or immigrate to the US.51 For example, an alien may be
denied admission to, or deported from, the US for,
commit[ting] an act that the individual ...reasonably should [have] know[n]
provides material support to ... a designated organization ... or ... a non-
designated terrorist organization or a member of such an organization, unless
the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization.52
Given the lack of publiclyavailable records of most immigration proceedings, as well
as the possibility that the threat of this provision could be utilized to dissuade
individuals from pursuing immigration or asylum claims, the extent or degree to
47 Section 106 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended the IEEPA by adding the phrase ‘block during the
pendency of an investigation’ after the word ‘investigate’ in 50 U.S.C. para. 1702 (a)(1)(B).
48 The list of parties subject to EO 13224 are on OFAC’s website, available at: http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 4 December 2011).
49 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp.2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
50 Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Civil No. 07-1155-KI, 2009 WL 3756363
(D. Or. Nov. 5, 2009); Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 585 F.Supp. 2d 1233
(D. Or. 2008).
51 A commentator recently raised related concerns regarding the scope of these provisions in the context of
relief efforts in Libya: ‘any non-citizens who work for humanitarian agencies–such as my colleagues on
our emergency response team from Ireland, Australia, France, and Canada–could be barred from
entering or returning to the U.S. for providing “material support” to a “terrorist group”. Even U.S. citizens
could face prosecution on these grounds’. Anne Richards, ‘On the Libyan border: helping freedom ﬁghters
or terrorists?’, The Hill’s Congress Blog, 28 March 2011, available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/foreign-policy/152143-on-the-libyan-border-helping-freedom-ﬁghters-or-terrorists (last visited 4
December 2011).
52 Immigration and Nationality Act, para. 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. para. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). See generally
Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal
of Aliens, Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2010, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/RL32564.pdf (last visited 4 December 2011).
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635which this provision has been utilized in the immigration context is unknown. In
any event, aside from the impact on humanitarian engagement highlighted
elsewhere in this article, those working on refugee, asylum, and resettlement issues
must also be increasingly aware of the relationship between the counter-terrorism
framework and the international and domestic norms protecting asylum seekers
and refugees.53
Administrative regulations
In order to ensure that funds are not diverted to proscribed terrorist organizations,
‘[a]ll NGOs applying for grants from USAID [United States Agency for
International Development] are required to certify, before award of the grant will
be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists’.54 Such
certiﬁcations require the recipients of USAID funding to attest they have not
provided (within ten years) and will not provide material support or resources to
FTOs, to SDNs or SDGTs, or to individuals or entities designated by the UN
Security Council’s sanctions committee established under Security Council
Resolution 1267.55 In addition to reviewing those lists, USAID recipients must
certify that they will take into account public information that is ‘either reasonably
available to the applicant ...or that, from the totality of the facts and circumstances
... the applicant should be aware of an individual or entity’s terrorist ties’.56
More detailed vetting procedures are reportedly required for NGOs applying for
USAID grants to areas such as the West Bank, Gaza, Somalia, Afghanistan, and
Yemen.57
These USAID certiﬁcations expressly do not extend to
furnishing USAID funds or USAID-ﬁnanced commodities to the ultimate
beneﬁciaries of USAID assistance ...unless the Recipient has reason to believe
that one or more of the beneﬁciaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates,
facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to
commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.58
53 See, e.g., Steven H. Schulman, ‘Victimized twice: asylum seekers and the material-support bar’,i nCatholic
University Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2009–2010, p. 949; Human Rights First, Denial and Delay: The
Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism Bars” on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States,
November 2009, available at: http://www.humanrightsﬁrst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/RPP-
DenialandDelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf (last visited 4 December 2011).
54 Statement issued by USAID to the Congressional Research Service on 5 February 2009. Jim Zanotti, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, Congressional Research Service, 13 January 2011, p. 7, available at: http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf (last visited 24 January 2012).
55 USAID, ‘AAPD 04–14: Certiﬁcation regarding Terrorist Financing Implement E.O. 13224 (Revision 2)’,
Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive, 24 September 2004, p. 3, available at: http://www.usaid.gov/
business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_14.pdf (last visited 4 December 2011).
56 Ibid., p. 4.
57 Testimony of Dr Rajiv Shah, USAID Administrator, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 12 April 2010,
available at: http://kirk.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=137 (last visited 4 December 2011).
58 USAID, ‘AAPD 04–14’, above note 55, para. d of the certiﬁcation.
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636As with the material-support statute and EO 13224, relatively little is currently
known about the ultimate depth of these certiﬁcations in terms of their impact on
end-user beneﬁciaries of humanitarian goods.
Multilateral counter-terrorism regimes
Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) et seq. and Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001) et seq.
Acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security
Council has created two counter-terrorism regimes with the capacity to affect
humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, one of which is focused on the Taliban and
Al Qaeda, while the other is not speciﬁc to a particular group. It is hard to overstate
the normative power of resolutions decided under the Council’s Chapter VII
authority. UN member states are obliged to accept them and carry them out,
including, where necessary, by enacting domestic laws.59 Extensive bureaucracies
have been built to enforce both regimes. While neither counter-terrorism regime
instituted by the Security Council under review here may yet function to regulate
humanitarian action in all UN member states in the same manner and with the
same clarity as the US material-support law, the language of both resolutions–and
especially Resolution 1373–can clearly be utilized by states, particularly host states,
wishing to restrict humanitarian organizations’ access to and engagement with
NSAGs.
Resolutions 1267 (1999) et seq. require all UN member states to freeze the
funds and other ﬁnancial assets of individuals and entities designated by a sanctions
committee, as well as to prevent the entry or transit through their territories of
designated individuals.60 As of March 2011, the Consolidated List included 395
individuals and 92 entities and other groups associated with the Taliban or Al
Qaeda.61 Resolutions 1373 (2001) et seq. require all UN member states to ‘[r]efrain
from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons
involved in terrorist acts’, as well as to prohibit their nationals and individuals in
their territories from making economic or ﬁnancial resources or services, among
other things, available for the beneﬁt of individuals or entities involved in certain
terrorist acts.62 Resolution 1373 further obliges all UN member states to ‘[c]
riminalize the willful provision ..., by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by
their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be
59 UN Charter, Art. 25. See also UN Charter, Art. 103.
60 UNSC Res. 1267, 15 October 1999; UNSC Res. 1333, 19 December 2000; UNSC Res. 1390, 28 January
2002; UNSC Res. 1455, 17 January 2003; UNSC Res. 1526, 30 January 2004; UNSC Res. 1617, 29 July
2005; UNSC Res. 1735, 22 December 2006; UNSC Res. 1822, 30 June 2008; and UNSC Res. 1904, 17
December 2009.
61 The Consolidated List is available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml (last visited 4
December 2011).
62 UNSC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001, paras. 1(d) and 2(a). UNSC Res. 1456, 20 January 2003; UNSC Res.
1535, 26 March 2004; UNSC Res. 1624, 14 September 2005; UNSC Res. 1787, 10 December 2007; UNSC
Res. 1805, 20 March 2008; and UNSC Res. 1963, 20 December 2010.
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637used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out
terrorist acts’, and to ‘[e]nsure that any person who participates ...in supporting
terrorist acts is brought to justice’.63 Domestic and international legal challenges
to the implementation of the 1267 and 1373 regimes have been brought in courts in
the European Community, the US, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland,
Pakistan, Turkey, and Canada, as well as in the Human Rights Committee.64 Thus
far, these challenges have focused on the due process concerns pertaining to the
mechanisms for listing and de-listing, not on humanitarian engagement concerns as
such.
Understanding government approaches, discerning the impact
on humanitarian organizations, and exploring possible
humanitarian responses
The two normative trajectories described above–one rooted in IHL recognizing the
importance of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in NIACs, and the other
aiming to prohibit the provision of material support to ‘terrorist’ groups–seem to
evince a clear contradiction. For many, this raises questions: what are the ultimate
goals of governments promulgating such opposing normative frameworks? How
can humanitarian organizations better understand the approaches taken by
governments, particularly those deeply involved in the global humanitarian project
as donors and policy innovators? This section brieﬂy explores potential explanations
that might assist in interpreting states’ behaviours regarding these countervailing
norms. The section then discusses what impacts these differing norms might have
on humanitarian organizations, and how humanitarian organizations might
respond to them.
Understanding government approaches
This subsection brieﬂy identiﬁes four potential explanations of states’ behaviours
that, on the one hand, recognize the importance of humanitarian engagement with
NSAGs in NIAC, and, on the other hand, curtail such engagement through counter-
terrorism laws and policies.
63 UNSC Res. 1373, paras. 1(b) and 2(e).
64 See generally Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘United Nations sanctions in domestic courts: from interpretation
to deﬁance in Abdelrazik v. Canada’,i nJournal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010,
pp. 249–251; Yvonne Terlingen, ‘The United States and the UN’s targeted sanctions of suspected
terrorists: what role for human rights?’,i nEthics & International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2010, pp. 131–
142. The UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has stated that
Resolution 1373’s ‘continued application nine years later cannot be seen as a proper response to a speciﬁc
threat to international peace and security. Resolution 1373 (2001) goes beyond the powers conferred upon
the Security Council and continues to pose risks to the protection of a number of international human
rights standards’. Sixth Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN General Assembly, A/65/258, 6 August
2010, para. 69.
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638Total prohibition
The ﬁrst possible explanation sees the ultimate goal of the state in this regard as total
prohibition of any beneﬁt to, assistance for, or co-ordination with listed NSAGs,
even if that prohibition risks the loss of humanitarian services to civilian
populations or the disbanding of major humanitarian operations in territories
controlled by listed NSAGs. This explanation is reﬂected, for example, in a broad
2001 call by the then US Secretary of Defense to end all ‘support’ beneﬁtting
‘terrorists’.65
The ‘total prohibition’ understanding sees the state as coherent and
strategic in its thinking. The state is making a clear choice to favour security interests
over humanitarian principles or humanitarian rationales for engagement with
NSAGs. In this mode, states may even see humanitarian organizations as naïve ‘soft
spots’ in counter-terrorism efforts, unthinkingly and unknowingly providing
succour and political legitimacy to dangerous militant groups.
Mitigation
The second possible explanation for these countervailing regulatory trajectories is
that states seek mitigation of beneﬁts to NSAGs. Under this model, states wish to
utilize domestic laws and international and donor policies to rein in humanitarian
actors’ interactions with NSAGs because they wish to limit the threats that this
interaction presents to security by making humanitarian organizations more
accountable. This explanation holds that, rather than being contradictory, the two
trajectories are meant to signal that humanitarian organizations will be held
responsible, if they do not take certain prescribed steps, for their engagement with
listed NSAGs. The ‘mitigation’ explanation is reﬂected, for example, in the
monitoring-and-reporting requirements imposed by the UN Security Council in
the limited humanitarian-assistance carve-out for Somalia in Resolution 1916.66
A policy of ‘mitigation’ may be rational for individual states, and may
indeed serve as part of a coherent approach to making humanitarian organizations
more accountable. Yet it may be impossible for any global humanitarian actor to
satisfy all of the mitigation and accountability standards of various individual
donors, states, and multilateral agencies.
Fragmentation
A third explanation suggests a lack of integration of internal policies, with some
state organs supporting counter-terrorism measures as a priority and others
promoting humanitarian action. In some ways the opposite of prohibition of
65 Donald Rumsfeld, Transcript, Department of Defense News Brieﬁng, 18 September 2001, available at:
http://replay.web.archive.org/20041118041827/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2001/t09182001_t0918sda.
html (last visited 4 December 2011).
66 UNSC Res. 1916, 19 March 2010, paras. 4, 5, and 11; see also UNSC Res. 1972, 17 March 2011.
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639engagement with NSAGs, ‘fragmentation’ holds that the seemingly incoherent and
confusing nature of these trajectories is just that: incoherent and confusing. The
‘fragmentation’ model proposes that states lack internal consistency, with counter-
terrorism and humanitarianism competing for normative supremacy. The
uncertainty resulting from fragmentation may be intentional or unintentional, but
this model holds that there is no overarching state policy to be identiﬁed. As an
example, when certain data regarding the tremendous scope of US funding for
humanitarian assistance67 are read next to the material-support statute,68 it would
appear that the various branches (and sub-branches) of the US government are not
necessarily acting in concert.
Under the ‘fragmentation’ theory, states would be seen as internally divided
and lacking in proper channels of communication within their own government
agencies. In this understanding, it may be that the state, writ large, is not fully aware
of the functional impact of its counter-terrorism laws and policies on international
aid and assistance. Indeed, the state may lack a grand strategy of how the two
trajectories should be harmonized. Of course, it may be that counter-terrorism laws
and policies reﬂect states’ desire to keep multiple political and security objectives in
play, and that this approach to foreign policy may allow states to keep humanitarian
actors in a defensive posture.
Co-optation
The ﬁnal explanation for the behaviour of states is co-optation. Rather than seeking
to engage in a ‘course correction’ by making humanitarian organizations more
accountable, or rather than wishing to limit what they see as the excesses of
humanitarian willingness to bend to the wishes of armed actors, states instead see
the two countervailing trajectories as a basis for ‘co-optation’ of humanitarianism
into the security and political objectives of the state. This perspective sees
humanitarian organizations as providing key intelligence to security actors, as well
as direct military relief efforts.69
67 Global Humanitarian Assistance, ‘United States: country proﬁle’, available at: http://www.globalhumani-
tarianassistance.org/countryproﬁle/united-states (last visited 4 December 2011): ‘The United States is the
largest humanitarian donor, providing over US$4 billion in humanitarian aid in both 2008 and 2009.
Sudan has been the top recipient of the United States’ humanitarian aid each year since 2004, receiving US
$674 million in 2008. The United States provides the majority of its humanitarian aid as food aid–over
US$2 billion in 2008, the largest single share of which (US$538 million) went to Ethiopia. The United
States provides a relatively high share of its overall aid budget in the form of humanitarian
assistance–over 16% in 2008.’
68 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(a)(1): ‘Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of
years or for life.’
69 See, e.g., Robert Burns, ‘Envoy laments weak US knowledge about Taliban’, Associated Press, 7 April 2009,
available at: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008961176_apusafghanistan.html (last
visited 24 January 2012): ‘[Richard] Holbrooke said the U.S. would “concentrate on [the information
deﬁcit in Afghanistan], partly through the intelligence structure” and partly through private aid groups
that provide humanitarian and other services in Afghanistan. He estimated that 90 percent of U.S.
knowledge about Afghanistan lies with aid groups.’ See also US Embassy, Islamabad, ‘U.S. troops reach
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640In a ‘co-optation’ approach, governments may be seen as responding to
the diversion of humanitarian assistance and the potential legitimization of
terrorist groups, not by engaging in regulation to mitigate this harmful effect but
rather by structuring regulation so that humanitarian organizations are increasingly
incorporated into the aid, reconstruction, and national security agenda of the state.
This approach sees humanitarianism and the access of the humanitarian commu-
nity to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population as central to contemporary
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.
Potential impacts for humanitarian organizations and possible
responses
This subsection explores the question of how the complex web of laws and policies
discussed above might affect humanitarian organizations and their work in
situations of NIAC, and then identiﬁes a few potential ways in which humanitarian
organizations might respond to these impacts.
It is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty the likelihood of
actual prosecutions against humanitarian organizations or their staff. Combined,
the counter-terrorism laws discussed here and the interpretations of these laws by
the relevant government body (whether it be the US Supreme Court, the
Department of Justice, OFAC, or USAID) create a threat to a large array of
activities that are, nonetheless, often sanctioned, encouraged, planned, and funded
by the same government. Donor governments may maintain this posture–as
informal, tenuous, and implicit as it may be–so long as they do not perceive the
concerned FTOs as presenting insuperable threats to the state’s security or its
political interests. States might (retroactively) invoke their criminal laws or other
sanctions against humanitarian organizations, however, if this balance tips in favour
of perceived security.
Even assuming the continued trend of non-prosecution of international
humanitarian organizations continues, what are the other potential impacts of these
laws and policies beyond criminal liability? Despite the absence of sufﬁcient
empirical orcase-based studies on the effect of these criminal and regulatory laws on
the humanitarian ﬁeld, a number of possible impacts bear consideration by the
humanitarian profession as a whole.
First, it may be that the presence and indeed expansion of laws
criminalizing material support (including training and expert assistance) to listed
entities will begin to affect governments’ funding choices. That is, where
governments become aware that their humanitarian aid funding will be used in a
state whose territory is partially or totally controlled by a listed group, those
governments may determine that there is no way to continue this funding without
ﬂood relief milestone, deliver 25 million pounds of aid’, United States Central Command, 23 November
2010, available at: http://www.centcom.mil/pakistan-ﬂood/u-s-troops-reach-ﬂood-relief-milestone-deli-
ver-25-million-pounds-of-aid (last visited 4 December 2011), stating that ‘U.S. military aircraft supporting
Pakistan’s ﬂood relief efforts achieved another humanitarian milestone Sunday, delivering 25 million
pounds of relief supplies since Aug. 5, when U.S. military relief ﬂight operations in Pakistan began.’
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indication that this has already occurred, for example in the case of Somalia, where a
designated group (namely al-Shabaab, which is listed at both the US and
international levels) controls much of the territory.70
Second, one of the most vexing and complex impacts of the laws and
policies discussed here may be virtually impossible to measure and weigh against the
beneﬁts of such legislation for counter-terror purposes: the chilling effect. This
occurs when organizations, faced with the risk of criminal sanction or intimidated
by increasingly strict administrative procedures required for projects carried out in
areas where listed groups are active,71 may simply decide to cut back on or halt their
projects before any action is taken against them. Anecdotally, there is some evidence
of organizations ceasing training activities, diminishing the scope of their proposals
for government funding in emergency contexts, or reconsidering priorities where
they sense a high risk of liability.72 Because of the confusing and contradictory
nature of these laws and policies, a signiﬁcant risk of the chilling effect is that
humanitarian organizations will limit themselves far beyond the actual limits of the
law. The organizations may choose to take a conservative approach, which is thus
less beneﬁcial to civilian populations in need, in order to salvage their most critical
programmes. Given the current general sense that staff from certain countries or
certain faith groups are at higher risk of scrutiny or criminal liability, organizations
may selectively limit their partner organizations, their staff, or their co-operation, in
order to limit their exposure.
Possible humanitarian responses
In reviewing the provisions of IHL relevant to the work of independent, impartial
humanitarian organizations in situations of NIAC, it is clear that the space for
credible organizations to engage with all parties to the conﬂict, and especially those
that control access to vulnerable populations, is central to the notion of neutral
humanitarianism. Indeed, in an armed conﬂict setting, where humanitarian
assistance may be the only reliable source of life-saving food, clean water, medical
care, shelter, and clothing for civilians behind enemy lines, the capacity of
humanitarian organizations to negotiate directly with parties to the conﬂict
(without the suspicion that they represent the foreign policy goals of other parties
70 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘U.N. ofﬁcials assail U.S. on limiting Somali aid’,i nNew York Times, 18 February 2010,
p. 8, reporting that in 2009 ‘the American government provided less than half of what it did in 2008 for
Somalia aid operations partly because United Nations agencies and private aid groups refused to sign an
agreement to police the distribution of aid more closely, contending that it would make deliveries nearly
impossible’.
71 Such as the anti-terror certiﬁcations, described above in the section on ‘Administrative regulations’.
72 The UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights noted during a press
conference that there was a feeling within the humanitarian ﬁeld that Resolution 1267 had a ‘chilling
effect’ on humanitarian aid, owing to the risk that charity aid would be identiﬁed as indirectly funding
terrorist organizations. UN Department of Public Information, ‘Press Conference by Special Rapporteur
on Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism’, 26 October 2010, available at: http://www.un.
org/News/brieﬁngs/docs/2010/101026_Scheinin.doc.htm (last visited 4 December 2011).
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their neutral posture and to serve those in need. This space for engagement
and protected autonomy to deal with even the most unsavoury leaders in order to
offer basic services to the civilian population is at the crux of IHL’s modest
recognition of the role and responsibility of humanitarian organizations in
alleviating suffering.
Scholars have noted that IHL does not create a ‘right of humanitarian
access’ or an unlimited mandate for humanitarian organizations to carry out any
activities they wish at any time and in any manner they choose.74 Yet, at the very
least, IHL applicable in NIACs recognizes that impartial humanitarian organiz-
ations may of their own volition offer their services to the parties to the conﬂict.75
Indeed, with the adoption of Common Article 3 more than sixty years ago, partiesto
NIACs ‘can no longer look upon it [such an offer of humanitarian services] as an
unfriendly act, nor resent the fact that the organization making the offer has tried to
come to the aid of the victims of the conﬂict’.76 It is this assumption that the
counter-terrorism model turns on its head.
If the types of impact identiﬁed above are seen as largely affecting projects
and programmes, humanitarian organizations may develop a range of strategic and
tactical responses, ranging from conceding (partial) incorporation into security and
political approaches to (selectively) ending relationships with certain donors to
(temporarily) ceasing activities in certain NIACs such as those in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.77 However, in reacting to the more existential threat cutting to the core
of humanitarianism–that is, the autonomy to engage directly with all parties to an
armed conﬂict and offer services for the beneﬁt of the civilian population–
humanitarian organizations may develop responses at the underlying normative
level, as discussed below.
Developing new norms to regulate humanitarian engagement with
NSAGs
If the tensions between humanitarian law and policy, on the one hand, and counter-
terrorism law and policy, on the other, are as fundamental as highlighted here, the
humanitarian community may determine that the only way out of the impasse is to
focus on the creation of new national or international norms clearly delineating the
role, means, and methods of humanitarian organizations engaging with NSAGs in
situations of NIAC. These norms might come in the form of a new treaty on NIAC,
or some other international declaration of principled humanitarianism to be
codiﬁed in national laws. In previous moments of IHL innovation and development,
humanitarian restraints on state military and security interests have prevailed in
73 As mentioned in note 8 above, according to the ICRC offers of humanitarian relief in NIAC may not be
regarded as unfriendly acts.
74 See, e.g., Y. Dinstein, above note 5.
75 Common Article 3. See above notes 6 and 8, and the corresponding text.
76 Sandoz et al., above note 6, p. 41.
77 Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict Research, above note 13, pp. 27–37.
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participated in these earlier high moments of IHL law-making and interpretation
may today be insufﬁcient to sustain the legal reafﬁrmation of independent
interactions with NSAGs. When internal conﬂicts are framed as efforts to combat
terrorism, such interactions, however benevolent in intent, may be seen as creating
unacceptable risks for states’ political and security goals.
Developing new policy avenues to facilitate negotiation of access with
NSAGs
If the terms of engagement with NSAGs cannot be developed in an open and formal
dialogue with states, the terms may need to be elaborated by the organizations
themselves as professional standards against which the activities of the organiz-
ations can be assessed. Unlike the option of developing norms and focusing on
positive law, this policy-oriented approach is likely to involve ad hoc agreements
with states and military representatives within a variety of contexts, and may be far
more difﬁcult to co-ordinate across the humanitarian profession. Some have argued
that the policy-oriented solution to the dilemmas raised in this article might involve
(additional) self-regulation on the part of humanitarian organizations, an effort to
respond to the counter-terrorism requirements by demonstrating the capacity and
willingness of humanitarian organizations to regulate their own engagements with
NSAGs with an eye to limiting any beneﬁts that might reach listed groups. Some
organizations have reacted negatively to suggestions of ‘enhanced’ due diligence
and self-regulation, or other attempts by the humanitarian community to impose
collective limitations on its engagements with NSAGs. Large humanitarian
NGOs and UN agencies may be willing to accept increasingly stringent restrictions
on their engagements from speciﬁc donors or host states (for example, the
USAID regulations discussed above, or the requirements placed on NGOs by host
states such as Pakistan, Sudan, or Sri Lanka). Such arrangements might be preferable
to a wholesale standardization of the regulations concerning humanitarian
engagement with NSAGs, including the establishment of professional standards
and accountability procedures that would expose sensitive information to external
scrutiny.
‘Opting out’
Humanitarian organizations might also conclude that neither the development of
new norms nor the promulgation of system-wide standards is plausible in light of
political or other limitations. For those organizations that base their reputation,
their capacity to negotiate with NSAGs, and their relationship with beneﬁciaries on
their commitment to humanitarian principles, the counter-terrorism-related laws
and regulations discussed above might be perceived as particularly damaging and as
posing too high a risk. These organizations might choose to ‘opt out’ of emergency
humanitarian operations that fall within the web of counter-terrorism laws: namely,
those humanitarian engagements that involve the negotiation and delivery of
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organizations might remain in countries experiencing internal conﬂict but refrain
from any operations that would put them into contact with such groups. While
recognizing that this would result in reduced services to populations under the
control of listed groups, these humanitarian organizations may nonetheless choose
‘opting out’ of engagement with listed NSAGs as a lesser-of-two-evils approach to
their work on the ground.
Staying below the radar
Another potential response from the humanitarian community might be to attempt
to avoid detection by counter-terrorism agencies. While recognizing the applica-
bility of criminal statutes and restrictive donor regulations to their operations, these
organizations might try to obfuscate their engagement with NSAGs (for example, by
renting cars from private companies rather than paying taxes to listed NSAGs, or by
disguising technical trainings as informal meetings with the community). Other
organizations might simply not disclose information about interactions with listed
NSAGs to donors and authorities, or even between ﬁeld ofﬁces and headquarters, in
violation of applicable laws and donor agreements. Such ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’
approaches might be quietly accepted or even encouraged by donor representatives
who attempt to maintain plausible deniability regarding the speciﬁc relationship
between their grantees and listed NSAGs, thereby helping to ensure that substantial
humanitarian aid funding is still able to be delivered in targeted areas where NSAGs
operate. This approach might extend status quo engagements for the short term but
can create signiﬁcant future liabilities. Unlike ‘opting out’, the ‘staying below the
radar’ response may maintain the primary humanitarian imperative while under-
mining other core professional principles in terms of transparency, accountability,
and co-ordination. Such an approach may invite increased interference from
NSAGs, who may be able to exert additional inﬂuence on the conditions of
humanitarian assistance when they are aware that organizations are seeking to
operate in a less-than-transparent manner.
‘Opting in’
A ﬁnal approach that some within the humanitarian community might consider in
light of the risks discussed here constitutes ‘opting in’ to integrated models of relief
and protection activities, under the leadership of political and security actors. While
humanitarian organizations might thereby lose signiﬁcant independence and
autonomy in their prospective engagements with listed NSAGs, this approach
might allow for more overall space for interacting with NSAGs (albeit in a far more
constrained and monitored context), as well as increased scope for delivery of goods
and services. In such a model, even states with very restrictive material-support laws
might choose to permit otherwise unlawful engagements and activities beneﬁting
listed groups, determining that the oversight and scrutiny of the work of
humanitarian organizations can allow for some support to fall into the hands of
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while also promulgating stringent material-support laws, integrating humanitarian
organizations into political and security schemes might be an appealing way of
maintaining both support for vulnerable populations and the government’s
international reputation as a donor state. Under this model, states would probably
permit a small group of ‘vetted’ humanitarian organizations to carry out assistance
operations, including engagement with listed NSAGs, perhaps relying on the most
elite and long-standing organizations to carry out the bulk of approved projects. For
humanitarian organizations, this approach would have the beneﬁt of minimizing
legal liabilities and unpredictability, as well as allowing the maintenance of some
engagements with listed NSAGs, but at the cost of being subject to political and
security decisions beyond their control regarding the scope and operational
independence of their work in speciﬁc conﬂict situations. In addition, NSAGs and
beneﬁciaries might increasingly call into question the independence and neutrality
of humanitarian organizations that ‘opt in’ to donor states’ security schemes in these
ways.
Questions about this approach may be seen in the current heated
debate within the humanitarian establishment regarding how to understand the
potential carve-out of exemptions and licensing schemes.78 Some within the
humanitarian community see it as the best and safest short-term strategy to
minimize liability and risk, and to indicate to donors that they take seriously the
threat of misappropriation of funds to terrorist entities. Others worry that the
introduction of these schemes into humanitarian negotiations will create a two-
tiered system–operations for which exemptions are granted and operations for
which exemptions are not granted (regardless of the underlying IHL and
international normative frameworks but with signiﬁcant potential consequences in
terms of domestic legal liability).
Conclusion
In many ways, the web of laws and policies discussed in this article seems paralysing
for humanitarian actors: an impossible regulatory framework in which success or
compliance in one arena is likely to raise risks and liabilities in another. Nonetheless,
billions of dollars of humanitarian funding continue to ﬂow to humanitarian
organizations, nearly all of which have operations in countries where listed NSAGs
control or operate from part of the territory. States continue to uphold principles of
humanitarian access and assistance in the UN Security Council, the General
Assembly, and other forums. And donors continue to encourage humanitarian
organizations to act in a transparent, accountable manner. As such, it is unlikely that
humanitarianism, as a professional ﬁeld and as a set of legal and normative
78 These are frameworks that allow humanitarian organizations to apply for discrete, context-speciﬁc
exemptions to criminal or regulatory laws in order to carry out operations in areas where listed groups
control territory, or where there is a high likelihood of having to engage with listed NSAGs.
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contradictions described here will almost certainly have a signiﬁcant impact over
time on the development of humanitarian practices and policies. The balancing of
these contradictory norms will require expanded negotiation skills and a thorough
legal understanding on the part of humanitarian professionals, both at the stage of
planning operations at headquarters and at the stage of implementing programmes
in the ﬁeld.
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